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| Roman republican legionary at Carrhae by Amelianvs - Deviantart |
The battle of Carrhae has received far less attention. It deserves more.
Rome had almost reached its territorial zenith by the end of the reign of Augustus. Up until Trajan, the empire expanded no further. Rome was far more aggressive during the republican era than in the Principate. Crassus, the Roman leader at Carrhae, was very much part of the expansionist Republican mindset and may have set his sights further than a conquest of Parthia had he succeeded. Perhaps, like Alexander the Great, he viewed the Parthian landscape as the door to Afghanistan. If Rome conquered Arabia to the South and held it as part of the Empire, it would be entirely possible that Islam would never have been born!
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| The Roman republic at the height of its power |
The Carrhae campaign of 53 BC is among the few wars that Rome either lost or experienced no gainful result. This stands out in stark contrast to other battles fought by the Romans. The Roman losses against the Cimbrian tribes, such as Arausio and Noreia could be attributed to poor leadership, lack of military reform (it happened before the Marian reforms took widespread effect) and being grossly outnumbered, sometimes by a factor of ten. The battle of Cannae took place between forces of roughly similar size and composition. The battle of Teutoburg forest was an ambush in unfamiliar, closed terrain where Roman firepower and closed rank fighting could not be brought to bear against the Germanic tribes.
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| A peaceful forest, once the site of the Roman Empire's most brutal defeat |
In Carrhae, a force of around fifty thousand Romans were slaughtered by a Parthian cavalry force a mere fifth of its size! How did this happen?
Those familiar with the battle can give a rough description of what happened. The cavalry force, comprised of horse archers and armoured cataphracts acted in combination; when the Roman ranks closed in testudo (to protect themselves from archers), the Cataphracts charged, broke up the ranks and inflicted casualties. When the Romans loosened the formation to deal with this, the Cataphracts retreated and the horse archers took their turn to inflict casualties on the less protected Roman troops.
This is a roughly accurate summary of what happened. However, a few questions remained unanswered:
Why did closed rank formation of the Roman infantry fail against the Cataphract charge?
The Roman tactical formation was unusual but could be considered an almost ideal formation to deal with cavalry charges; the infantry square.
This formation proved itself most famously at the battle of Waterloo, where repeated French cavalry charges failed to break the British forces. Horses, it seems, will not charge at closed, disciplined ranks of men with sharp weapons in their hands. The Roman forces would meet those criteria as they would have looked like a wall with pila sticking out. How were the Cataphracts able to charge this effectively?
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| Infantry square at the Battle of Waterloo |
More importantly, in a large army with plenty of auxiliary archers, why were the horse archers not engaged with Roman firepower? Infantry archers will generally outperform their cavalry counterparts. They can stand behind a pavise (large shield) or wall and take fewer casualties than their mounted counterparts. The cataphracts were armoured head to toe, along with their horses, but the horse archers were not. These would be big, meaty targets to infantry archers.
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| The Sassanids were the successors of the Parthians |
The Mongol General, Subutai experienced this when facing Hungarian crossbowmen in the middle ages.
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| Subutai - The greatest Mongol General |
Furthermore, while the Cataphracts might not be engaged effectively by the Roman archers, any scorpio unit would be more than capable of penetrating their armour. The military historian Vegetius states that a Roman legion had around sixty-five scorpios per legion.
While Vegetius is detailing standard Roman practices of the empire period, it is certain from accounts of the Gallic wars and Caesars incursion into Britain that they were certainly a useful component. Why were they not employed in this battle? If the standard practices of the empire were followed, Crassus’ force would have had around several hundred artillery pieces!
To speculate as to what went wrong, we may have to examine the experiences of Crassus and the military strategy he may have adopted as a result.
Crassus was not a good Roman general, but he wasn’t the worst either.
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| Marcus Licinius Crassus |
He had earned fame in the Third Servile war, crushing Spartacus and his escaped gladiators in decisive battles. However, the credit for winning went to Pompey and Lucillus, who had merely been involved in tackling the remnants of the slave force once they had arrived late from Spain and Thrace respectively. This was an insult that Crassus would never forgive.
When he decided to invade Parthia, the allied king of the Armenians, Artavasdes II offered military aid, providing Crassus marched through Armenian territory.
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| Artavasdes II |
Crassus made his first major strategic blunder when he rejected the generous offer and crossed the river Euphrates instead. His desire for what he considered overdue glory eclipsed the greater prospect of decisive victory. The Armenian force of ten thousand cataphracts and thirty thousand infantry would have more than compensated for the tactical deficiencies of his own force.
Crassus prepared for battle after being informed of the small Parthian force led by Surena.
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| Surena |
He ignored the prudent advice to pitch camp and rest and continued to prepare for battle.
Forming the legions into a large hollow square, he awaited the Parthians. The Parthians, after an initial show of force surrounded the square with their mounted archers.
Here, Crassus made the first mistake in a series of mistakes. He sent his skirmishers (around four thousand altogether) out of the square to engage the Parthians. These were duly cut down by the large force of nine thousand horse archers. Foot archers are best deployed from a defensive and protected position. English longbowmen were typically defended from cavalry charges by stakes, while Genoese crossbowmen typically fought behind a pavise.
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| Genoese Crossbowmen were defeated at Crecy |
The crossbowmen’s failure at the battle of Crecy can be largely attributed to the fact that they have left their pavises on the supply train!
After this point, it is almost certain that the Parthians had complete fire superiority. The only ranged weapon available to Crassus’ infantry were the venerable pilum. The horses surrounded the square firing arrows with impunity.
Crassus ordered his men to form testudo formation. With the shields interlocked, he hoped to outlast the rain of arrows until the archers ran out of arrows. This might have been a good idea if Surena had not kept his archers well supplied with a large train of camels carrying spare arrows.
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| Testudo Formation |
The cataphracts move in! The Parthian heavy cavalry charge into the tightly packed Roman formation. While the testudo is an ideal mobile protection from arrows, it greatly restricts a soldier’s ability in close combat. When the Romans loosen formation to deal with the cataphracts, they retreat and allow the horse archers to take over.
To answer the question of how the cataphracts were able to charge a wall of shields and pilum tips, one might have to look at the way heavy cavalry horses were trained. In medieval times, the knightly destrier was trained to jump, kick and trample enemy troops in training regime known as ‘dressage’. It is possible that the Parthian cataphracts used methods like this to collapse the testudo wall and stab the vulnerable legionaries with their long lance.
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| Mounted knight on destrier |
What the Romans could have done to counter this was to use their sudis. Legionaries may have carried one or several. It is essentially a double pointed stake with a handle in the middle. The double pointed nature of the stake might exclude their use as a camp stake, given how easy it would be to uproot them or kick them down.*
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| Sudis from Aalen (source: Legionord) |
It is unclear to re-enactors exactly how the sudis or vallus was used, but experts suggest that there could have been several uses for this. Three could have been fastened together to form a large tribuli, or caltrop. Alternatively, many could have been joined and deployed as a ‘cheval-de-frise’.
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| Sudis as tribuli (source: Legionord) |
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| Cheval de Frise |
Either one of these options would have proven an excellent defense in stopping the Parthian heavy cavalry. No such thing was deployed however.
There is no mention of any artillery in the battle and we can be certain that their role in the battle was minimal (if present at all). While the humble Pilum might have done nothing to the cataphracts, the same could not be said for any scorpios.
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| Roman scorpion |
These would punch through any armour and devastate the Parthian ranks, even at extreme ranges. Crassus might not have been unusual in this regard though. Artillery really came to prominence in the Empire period, not the republic.
In summary:
What did Crassus get right? Nothing. What did Crassus get wrong? Everything.
This is why Rome lost.
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| The eagles returned to Rome |
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